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1.  Article 79 exempts a party from liability for damages when that party has failed to perform
any of its obligations, including the seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods.
2.1  If the non-performance or defective performance results from a third person’s failure to
perform, Article 79 sets forth different requirements for establishing an exemption,
depending  on  the  nature  of  the  engagement  of  the  third  person  with  the  contracting
party.
2.2 Article 79(1) remains the controlling provision even if a contracting party has engaged a
third person to perform the contract in whole or in part.
(a)  In general, the seller is not exempted under Article 79(1) when those within its
sphere  of  risk  fail  to  perform;  for  example,  the  seller’s  own  staff  or  personnel
and those engaged to provide the seller with raw materials or semi-manufactured
goods.  The  same  principle  applies  to  the  buyer  in  relation  to  the  buyer’s  own
staff  or  personnel  and  those  engaged  to  perform  the  obligations  of  the  buyer
under the contract.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, a contracting party may be exempted under Article
79(1) for the acts or omissions of a third person when the contracting party was
not able to choose or control the third person.
2.3 Article 79(2) applies when a contracting party engages an independent third person to
perform the contract in whole or in part. In such a case, the contracting party claiming
an exemption must establish that the requirements set forth in Article 79(1) are satisfied
both in its own regard and in regard to that third person.
3.1 A change of circumstances that could not reasonably be expected to have been taken
into account, rendering performance excessively onerous (“hardship”), may qualify as an
“impediment” under Article 79(1). The language of Article 79 does not expressly equate
the term “impediment” with an event that makes performance absolutely impossible.
Therefore, a party that finds itself in a situation of hardship may invoke hardship as an
exemption from liability under Article 79.
3.2 In a situation of hardship under Article 79, the court or arbitral tribunal may provide
further relief consistent with the CISG and the general principles on which it is based.




Introduction and scope of this opinion
Article 79 grants buyers and sellers an exemption from performance if they can establish that
nonperformance  was  due  to  an  “impediment”  beyond  their  control  which  they  could  not
reasonably have been expected to take into account when the contract was made and which, or
the consequences of which, they could not reasonably have been expected to avoid or
overcome. The second paragraph of Article 79 provides that a third person’s failure to perform
may  constitute  grounds  for  exemption  when  the  requirements  for  exemption  under  the  first
paragraph are satisfied with respect to both the party claiming exemption and the third person.
A party failing to perform is required under the fourth paragraph of Article 79 to provide
timely notice of the impediment and its effect on his ability to perform and, according to the
previous  third  paragraph,  the  effect  of  the  exemption is  limited  to  the  period  of  time  during
which the impediment subsists. The fifth and last paragraph of Article 79 does not restrict
either party from claiming relief other than damages.
At the time this opinion is issued, Article 79 has been invoked in litigation and arbitration by
sellers and buyers with limited success. Overall, sellers made only slightly more claims of
exemption than buyers. The types of “impediments” claimed as an exemption by sellers have
been as varied as those claimed by buyers, a variety matched by the types of goods involved in
the transactions.
Any survey of reported decisions is to be read with caution, because the number of cases
decided at this point do not allow but a few tentative conclusions regarding interpretative
trends on CISG Article 79. Thus, whereas sellers have succeeded in claiming an exemption in
some cases,2 in many others their claims were denied.3 Reported decisions also indicate that
2 An indicative list of meaningful cases where sellers qualified for relief under Article 79 includes: Tribunal
de commerçe de Besançon, France, 19 January 1998, available in English translation at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119f1.html> (excusing a seller, who was found to have acted in good faith,
on  account  of  defective  goods  manufactured  for  seller’s  supplier)  [hereinafter  cited  as  ”Tribunal  de  commerce
Besancon, 1998”; Handelsgericht des Kantons Zurich, Switzerland, 10 February 1999, CLOUT Case No. 331,
available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990210s1.html> (seller excused for paying
damages for late delivery due to carrier’s failure to meet a guarantee that the goods would be delivered on time);
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Russian Federation, 16 March 1995, CLOUT Case No. 140, available in English translation at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950316r1.html>  (seller  excused  due  to  an  emergency  halt  to  production  by
seller’s supplier); Schiedsgericth der Handelskammer Hamburg, Germany, 21 March 1996, Clout Case No. 166,
available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu./cases/960321g1.html>.
3 In two cases decided by Germany’s Supreme Court, subsequently addressed in this opinion, sellers were
held to be conceivably excused on account of their failure to deliver conforming goods, but such exemption was
denied  on the  specific  facts  of  those  cases.  See,  Bundesgerichtshof,  Civil  Panel  VIII,  Germany,  24  March 1999,
CLOUT  Case  No.  271,  available  in  English  translation  at  <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324g1.html>
[hereinafter referred to as the ”Vine wax case”]; Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 9 January 2002, available in English
translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1.html> [hereinafter the ”Powder milk case”]
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buyers were granted exemptions under Article 79,4 their excuses having been rejected in many
other cases.5 There  is  considerable  room for  judicial  appraisal  and divergent  interpretation  of
several words used in, and issues raised by, Article 79. However, the decisions reported to date
do  not  bear  out  concerns  that  courts  or  arbitral  tribunals  might  too  readily  excuse  a  party  to
perform, or initial fears that some civil law judges may reintroduce the requirement of fault by
allowing a seller to show that defects were beyond its control,6 or that some courts would rely
too much on their domestic legal systems’ concepts of force majeure and hardship with resulting
diverging interpretations.7
Quite to the contrary,  the bulk of judicial  decisions and arbitral  awards touching on Article 79
focus, by and large, on the standards for exemption that may qualify as excuses under the guise of
“impediments”.  However,  not  every  decision  identifies  facts  that  may  become relevant  to  draw
some tentative conclusions (e.g., the nationality of the parties, the type of goods involved or other
details of the transaction), while others are incomplete in the sense that they merely state that the
conditions of Article 79 have not been met. For example, a court finding a party exempted under
Article 79 may be presumably satisfied that the alleged impediment was beyond the control of
that party, yet one finds not much discussion in the available judicial decisions as to when that
4 An indicative list of meaningful cases where buyers qualified for relief under Article 79 includes: Tribunal
of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce, 22 January 1997,
available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970122r1.html>  (buyer  excused  to  pay
damages for failure to take delivery due to State official’s refusal to permit importation into the buyer’s country)
[hereinafter cited as ”Arbitration. Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce, 1997”]; Amtsgericht
Charlottenburg, Germany, 4 May 1994, available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/940915g1.html#cx> (buyer excused on account of seller’s delivery of non-conforming goods) [hereinafter
cited as ”Amtsgericht Charlottenburg, 1994”].
5 The following may be listed among the cases in which the buyer’s alleged impediment did not result in
the tribunal granting excuse under Article 79: Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Russian Federation, 17 October 1995, available in English
translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951017r1.html> (buyer not excused to pay the purchase price on
account of inadequate reserves of convertible currency), CLOUT Case No. 142; Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, Bulgaria, 12 February 1998, available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/980212bu.html> (buyer not excused due to negative market developments and problems relating to storage
of the goods).
6 For an opinion echoing this fear, see John Honnold, Uniform Law for  International  Sales  Under  the  1980
United Nations Convention § 423.3 (3rd ed.  1999),  available  at  <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/honnold.html>.
7 For a comprehensive list  of cases until  2004, where buyers and sellers were held to be excused and not
excused under Article 79, see The UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/79, 8 June 2004 [hereinafter ”UNCITRAL
Digest”] Article 79 (published  in  June,  2004,  and  referring  to  27  cases)  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-art-79.html>. For a constantly updated chronological list of cases on
Article 79, see Article 79. UNCITRAL’s Digest Cases Plus Added Cases, available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-cases-79.html>. See also, Peter Winship, Exemptions  Under  Article  79
of the Vienna Sales Convention, RabelsZ (2004) 495-510; Ronald A. Brand, The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond.
Article 79, in 1 CILE Studies 392-407 (2005); Sonja A. Kruisinga, ”(Non-)conformity in the 1980 UN Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: a uniform concept?”, Intersentia (2004) 123-154.
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requirement should be deemed to have been met. Similarly, few cases have focused expressly on
the requirements to be met for a party to claim successfully that the impediment could not have
been reasonably taken into account at the time the contract was concluded. In the absence of
decisions providing these type of guidelines it is not possible to assess whether courts and arbitral
tribunals are relatively in harmony in their interpretation of Article 79. However, that at this
point in time courts and arbitral tribunals have failed to provide firm guidelines does not make
those requirements less important for an excuse to be found under Article 79. But this state of
affairs explains why this opinion focuses on a limited number of issues that are likely to provoke
differences in interpretation in different jurisdictions.
There  are  issues  under  Article  79  that,  either  as  a  result  of  flexibility  in  the  language  of  the
provision and an unusual level of ambivalence in its drafting history, leave courts and
arbitrators with significant leeway when applying Article 79 to the facts before them. This
opinion focuses  on  those  issues  because  they  are  the  most  likely  to  be  treated  in  light  of  the
arbitrator’s or judge’s national law; or at least the most susceptible to provoke divergent
approaches. One of those issues is whether a seller that has delivered non-conforming goods is
eligible  to  claim  an  exemption  under  Article  79.  A  second  issue,  this  time  with  a  rather
confusing drafting history, concerns the requirements to be met under the first and second
paragraph of Article 79 by a seller that claims to be excused due to an impediment suffered by a
third-party  supplier  or  manufacturer  to  whom the  seller  looked  as  a  source  for  supplying  the
goods. A third issue that is likely to reveal divergence in the approaches of judges and
arbitrators is whether hardship may qualify as an “impediment” under Article 79 and, if so,
what type of relief may be granted to the aggrieved party. Divergent interpretations on or about
Article 79 may be discerned and continue to come up, but those issues may be the subject of
future advisory opinions.
1. Article 79 exempts a party from liability to pay damages for failing to perform any of its obligations,
including the seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods.
Comments
Whether a seller delivering non-conforming goods may claim exemption of liability for damages
under CISG Article 79 was an issue addressed at the Hague Conference in 1964, in connection
with the drafting of Article 74 of ULIS (the counterpart to CISG Article 79). At that time,
some delegates from common-law jurisdictions favoring a “warranty-based” liability in contract
law raised concerns that the prevailing view in civil law jurisdictions, to the effect that
contractual  liability  is  based  on  proof  of  fault,  might  unduly  influence  civil-law  judges  or
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arbitrators too ready to allow sellers to escape liability for defective performance, pleading
events beyond their control that could not have been taken into account.8
Concerns with filtering in a fault-based concept of liability prompted some legal commentators
to question whether delivery of defective goods may ever qualify as an impediment under
Article 79. Thus, it has been argued that the choice of the word “impediment” was intended to
denote an event external to the seller and to the goods, excluding the possibility that the seller’s
liability for defects in the goods could ever be excused under Article 79.9 In contrast, for those
who approach liability for non-conforming goods from the standpoint of fault, a defect present
in the goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract may conceivably constitute an
impediment to the seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods under CISG Article 35.
Indeed, to the extent that delivery of conforming goods is expressed as a contractual obligation
under the CISG (rather than in terms of warranties or guarantees), it stands to reason that a
breach of the obligation to deliver conforming goods amounts to a seller’s failure to perform
8 The discussion of this issue at the Hague Conference was centered on the choice between the word
”obstacle” as opposed to ”circumstances.” The latter word carried the day at The Hague on the assumption that a
seller could be conceivably exempted from liability if the defects could not possibly have been detected at the time
the contract was concluded. See Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations
Convention § 427 (3rd ed., 1999), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html>. The issue
was revived when, years later, the UNCITRAL Working Group decided to adopt the word ”impediment” in what
later became Article 79 of the CISG. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL Secretariat, Official Records, United Nations, New York, 1981, § 21 at 378 and § 36
at 380, also available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html>
9 See Barry Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.S. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods in Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., International Sales: The United Nations
Convention  on  Contracts  for  the  International  Sale  of  Goods,  Matthew  Bender  §  5.02  at  5-10,  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html>  (stating  that  the  choice  of  the  word  ”impediment”
resulted from the widely shared view that a seller could not be exonerated of liability for non-conforming goods).
Nicholas explains that for a common law lawyer, whose point of departure is strict liability under an implied
warranty of merchantability, it comes as something of a surprise that impossibility may be regarded as an excuse for
breach of this warranty. See Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility, op. cit. supra, § 5.02 at 5-13 (”The common
law lawyer does not, I think, see a warranty in the traditional sense as a promise of performance which is capable of
becoming impossible or impracticable or of being frustrated. It is not a promise of a performance, but a guarantee
of a fact and it is of the essence of a guarantee that impossibility is irrelevant to it.”).
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“any of his obligations.” Accordingly, this type of breach may conceivably be excused due to an
impediment of the kind described in Article 79.10
Cases in which a seller may be exempted of liability for delivering non-conforming goods are
extremely  rare.  For  example,  goods  that  are  unique  and the  subject  of  the  contract  may  have
already perished at the time of the conclusion of the contract and before the risk of loss passed
to  the  buyer.  In  this  exceptional  case,  Article  79  may  apply  as  long  as  the  seller  had  no
knowledge of the prior destruction and could not reasonably have been expected to take the
destruction of the goods into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.11 Indeed,
sellers have invoked Article 79 to claim exemption from liability for their failure to deliver
conforming goods and for late delivery -- but with very limited success.12 More importantly, fear
that extending the exemption to delivery of non-conforming goods might reintroduce the
principle of liability for fault through the “backdoor” has been allayed by the German Federal
Supreme Court.
In  the  “Vine wax case,”  a  seller  agreed  to  supply  vine  wax  to  be  used  by  the  buyer  to  protect
grafts of grape vines from drying out and from the risk of infection.13 The seller had acquired
the wax from his supplier, which manufactured the wax in part with raw materials provided by
a  Hungarian  supplier  the  seller  had  not  used  in  previous  years.  The  seller  forwarded  the  wax
from his supplier without opening the package, the wax did not protect the vines as it was
supposed to, and the buyer brought suit against the seller. The intermediate appellate court
found the seller liable for delivering goods below prevailing industry standards. Stating that in
10 As noted before, the view that a seller delivering defective goods cannot find refuge under Article 79
appears to derive from questionable inferences regarding the adoption of the word “impediment,” at least
whenever this term is read against the common law background of the warranty-based liability in contract. See
Honnold, op. cit. supra, at 427; Nicholas, op. cit. supra, § 5.02. However, the seller’s obligation to deliver goods
under the CISG is not established in terms of a warranty, but rather in terms of a general obligation to deliver
goods free from defects,  which includes an obligation to deliver substitute goods or repair the goods (CISG Art.
46(2)  and 46(3)).  Therefore,  an  insuperable  impediment  to  deliver  conforming  goods  may  be  able  to  excuse  the
seller. See Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber, in Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Commentary  on  the  UN
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) Article 79, at 812-13 (2d ed., Oxford University Press, 2005)
(hereinafter ”Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary on the CISG”) (questioning the inference that the adoption of
the word ”impediment” meant a return to the notion of ”obstacle”, which had been discarded for Article 74 of
ULIS,  as  if  this  choice  of  words  were  to  suggest  that  a  seller  could  find  no  excuse  under  CISG  Article  79  for
delivering non-conforming goods).
11 But see Denis Tallon, in Bianca-Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law at  577-78,  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html> (”… the absence of the subject matter raises a problem of
validity  which  is  not  governed  by  the  Convention  (see  Article  4(a)  …”.  See  also,  Commentary  on  the  Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL Secretariat, Official Records, United
Nations, New York, 1981, at 406, also available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html>.
12 In one case a French court exempted a seller for damages for failure to deliver conforming goods, and in
another case a Swiss court found a seller exempt for late delivery. But in at least nine other cases the UNCITRAL
Digest reports a seller’s claim for an exemption to have been denied. See UNCITRAL Digest and cases cited in
notes 13 and 14, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-79.html>.
13 OLG Zweibrücken 31 March 1998, CLOUT No 272.
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principle a seller could claim exemption when delivering non-conforming goods, the Regional
Appeal Court of Zweibrücken held the seller liable on the ground that he failed to inspect the
wax before sending it to the buyer. Affirming the seller’s liability on different grounds, the
Federal Supreme Court Germany (“BGH”) did not find it necessary to make a general
pronouncement on whether a seller could ever be exempt when delivering non-conforming
goods. Disagreeing with the reasoning of the lower appellate court, the BGH held that, unless
the parties otherwise agree (and in this case they did not), the seller undertakes the risk of
acquiring conforming goods when he does not manufacture them himself. This line of
reasoning suggests that the seller’s liability under the CISG is one of guarantee, irrespective of
fault, hence the irrelevance of the seller’s failure to inspect.14
The  BGH  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  expressly  address  whether  a  party’s  failure  to  perform
“any of his obligations” under the contract might include the failure of the seller or any of his
suppliers to deliver conforming goods. Yet, resorting to an explanation why the seller could not
be exempted from his failure to deliver conforming goods suggests that, in the opinion of the
German Supreme Court, Article 79 might conceivably be applied to excuse a seller’s failure to
deliver conforming goods.15 This reading of Article 79 conforms to what appears as the “plain
meaning” of Article 79. Both the language (“... any of his obligations...”) and the location of
this provision in the CISG (Chapter V: “Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller
and of the Buyer”) suggests that the delivery of non-conforming goods amounts to a failure to
perform an obligation within the meaning of Article 79 and Chapter V. Thus, there is no
reason to exclude this obligation from the broad range of obligations whose failure to perform
may be excused under Article 79.
In a subsequent case decided by the BGH, the “Powder milk case”,16 a buyer of powdered milk
found  the  milk  spoiled  by  lipase.  The  seller  sought  refuge  in  Article  79  arguing  and  even
establishing  that  inactive  lipase  could  not  have  been  detected  by  application  of  any  of  the
available and current testing techniques. The BGH was not satisfied with this excuse, holding that
it was not enough for the seller to prove that properly administered testing techniques would not
have detected lipase. The case was remanded to the lower court, which was instructed to ascertain
whether the introduction of the lipase could have actually escaped the seller’s control during the
whole manufacturing process of the powdered milk (i.e., either by the seller’s whole milk
suppliers or during the seller’s own processing of that milk). Thus, although recognizing that
14 The BGH made profuse citations to conflicting scholarly opinions as to whether by referring to an
impediment capable of exonerating the obligor from ”any of his obligations,” Article 79 could be relied upon to
excuse the seller’s obligations, and those of their suppliers, to deliver conforming goods.
15 The BGH remanded the case to the lower appellate court for a determination on mitigation of damages and on
whether  the  German  buyer  had  used  the  goods  for  a  purpose  other  than  the  one  intended  by  the  contract.  More
significant to the purposes of establishing the seller’s liability squarely under the first paragraph of Article 79, rather than
on the ”double force majeure” scenario of the second paragraph, is the court´s finding that the defects originated with
the seller’s ‘sphere of influence,” so those defects could have been foreseen and prevented by the seller.
16 BGH, 9 January 2002, available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1.html>.
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finding an excuse remains theoretically possible for a seller failing to deliver conforming goods,
this judicial decision stresses once again the extremely heavy burden of proof faced by a seller
seeking an excuse under Article 79 for delivering non-conforming goods.
Even if those decisions by the BGH fall short of an express pronouncement as to whether the
seller may be exempt for delivering defective goods, the possibility for sellers to be exempted
from liability under Article 79 for delivering non-conforming goods is reduced to a few
marginal circumstances. Assume, for example, the case of a seller bound to deliver frozen goods
which, due to a blackout or power failure occurring before the transfer of risk to the buyer but
after the seller parted with the goods, arrive in a decomposed state at the place of delivery.
Article 79 may apply in this case only if the seller succeeds in establishing that he did not know
of the blackout and that the power failure was totally beyond his control. The seller would not
be exempted of liability for damages if he reasonably could have been expected to take the
possibility of a power failure into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
There are indeed very few chances for the seller to find an excuse for delivering non-conforming
goods, for it is generally and correctly considered that sellers implicitly assume the risks
involved in the procurement of the goods they sell. However, in the absence of an express or
implicit warranty, the seller should not be deemed to guarantee, absolutely and
unconditionally, that the goods are free from defects. Article 79 will gain in certainty and
fairness if this straightforward interpretation is adopted, thus precluding dubious distinctions
between excuses for failure to comply with the obligation to deliver conforming goods and
those that may exonerate a party’s failure to comply with other obligations arising out of the
contract (e.g., failure to pack the goods in accordance with the contract under Article 35(2)(d)).
2.1 If the non-performance or defective performance results from a third person’s failure to perform, Article 79
sets forth different requirements for establishing an exemption, depending on the nature of the engagement
of the third person with the contracting party
2.2 Article 79(1) remains the controlling provision even if a contracting party has engaged a third person to
perform the contract in whole or in part.
(a) In general, the seller is not exempted under Article 79(1) when those within its sphere of risk fail to
perform; for example, the seller’s own staff or personnel and those engaged to provide the seller with
raw materials or semi-manufactured goods. The same principle applies to the buyer in relation to the
buyer’s own staff or personnel and those engaged to perform the obligations of the buyer under the
contract.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, a contracting party may be exempted under Article 79(1) for the acts or
omissions  of  a  third  person when the  contracting  party  was  not  able  to  choose  or  control  the  third
person.
2.3 Article 79(2) applies when a contracting party engages an independent third person to perform the contract
in whole or in part. In such a case, the contracting party claiming an exemption must establish that the
requirements set forth in Article 79(1) are satisfied both in its own regard and in regard to the third person.




The exemption under Article 79 would hardly become operative to relieve the seller  from the
obligation to deliver conforming goods in those cases in which the goods were produced,
manufactured,  and  delivered  by  the  seller  or  his  own  personnel,  or  in  those  cases  where  the
buyer is to take delivery and pay without relying on any intermediate agent. But when the
failure to deliver conforming goods, pay the price, or undertake any of the obligations arising
under the contract result from the activities or omissions of the seller’s secondary suppliers and
sub-contractors, or by intermediate agents engaged by the buyer to take delivery or pay the price,
the  question  arises  whether  such  failure  should  be  imputed  to  contracting  parties  under
paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of Article 79. Although Article 79(2) applies to both sellers and
buyers  seeking  an  excuse  on  account  of  a  third  person’s  failure  to  perform,  this  part  of  the
opinion focuses on the conditions under which a seller could claim an exemption due to failure
to perform by a third person.
Several courts and arbitral tribunals have addressed the question whether the seller may be
excused due to an impediment allegedly beyond the control of a supplier to whom the seller
looks to procure or produce the goods. In a handful of cases, the seller’s plea to be excused has
been granted, but in the majority of cases it has been held that the requirements of Article 79
have not been satisfied, even when the supplier’s failure to deliver conforming goods was totally
unforeseeable to the seller. Decisions vary, however, as to the analysis used by the courts to
reach their conclusions. Some courts place the analysis of whether the seller qualifies for such
an exemption under paragraph (1) of Article 79;17 other tribunals prefer to examine the seller’s
exoneration under paragraph (2);18 and  still  others  opt  for  deciding  the  issue  on  the  basis  of
Article 79 in the abstract.19 Whether the seller’s claim of exemption falls under one or the other
paragraph is relevant for the purpose of determining where to place the burden of proof. The
key  issue  is  whether  a  supplier,  subcontractor  or  third  person  to  whom  the  seller  looks  for
performance fits the phrase of Article 79(2) “a third person whom [the party claiming
exemption] has engaged to perform the whole or part of the contract.”
Article 79(2), where it applies, makes it more difficult to succeed in claiming an excuse because
it demands that the requirements for exemption under Article 79(1) be satisfied with respect to
both the party claiming exemption and the third person. It is not self-evident who are the “third
persons” referred to in the second paragraph of Article 79, whose wording seems to result from
17 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 28 February 1997, CISG-online 261, available in English
translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g1.html>; Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, partial
award of 21 March 1996, RIW, 1996, at 766 et seq., available in English translation at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960321g1.html>.
18 International Chamber of Commerce, Award 8128/1995, UNILEX J.D.I. 1996, 1024 et seq., available in
English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958128i1.html>
19 Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation, Award 155/1994, 16 March 1995, Clout No. 140;
available in English translation at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950316r1.html>
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a misunderstanding, among those who fought for the introduction of the second paragraph,
regarding the meaning of the previous first paragraph.
No one disputes that under Article 79(1) the seller bears the risk of non-conformity owed to its
own personal circumstances and to those employed by him to perform the contract and whose
work the seller is to organize, coordinate, or supervise. The problem sought to be addressed more
specifically in Article 79(2) is when the nonperformance or defective performance is due to the
act or omission of a person or legal entity separate and distinct from the seller. There are least two
different types of “third persons,” but only one type is sought to be covered by Article 79(2).
The first identifiable group of “third persons” is composed of those who, while not entrusted
with the performance of the contract vis-à-vis the buyer, nevertheless enable, assist, or create the
preconditions for the seller’s delivery of conforming goods. These “third persons” may be
distinct and separate from the seller, such as suppliers of raw materials, subcontractors of semi-
manufactured parts and other “ancillary” or “auxiliary” agents whose performance is a
precondition to the seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods. These third-party suppliers
or subcontractors, to whom the seller turns as a source for the supply of goods, are not the type
of “third persons” contemplated in Article 79(2). There is a consistent line of decisions
suggesting that the seller normally bears the risk that third-party suppliers or subcontractors
may breach their own contract with the seller, so that at least in principle the seller will not be
excused when the failure to perform was caused by its supplier’s default.20 Article 79(1) remains
the controlling provision to ascertain the liability of the seller for the acts or omissions of that
type of “third persons” whose default cannot be invoked by the seller to excuse his own failure
to deliver conforming goods. An exception should be allowed, however, for those very
exceptional cases in which the seller has no control over the choice of the supplier or its
performance, in which case the supplier’s default may be established as a genuine impediment
beyond the control of the seller.21
The second group of “third persons” identifiable under Article 79(2) is composed by those who
are “independently” engaged by the seller to perform all or part of the contract directly to the
buyer.  It  is  not  easy  to  ascertain  the  precise  meaning  of  “...  a  third  person  whom  [the  party
claiming exemption] has engaged to perform the whole or part of a contract ...”, but the
expression  seems  to  point  to  those  third  persons  who,  unlike  third-party  suppliers  or
subcontractors for whose performance the seller is fully responsible, are not merely separate and
20 See UNCITRAL Digest, Article 79, text accompanying note 56 and cases cited therein.
21 Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber, in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., Commentary on the UN
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) Article 79, at 819-22 (2d ed., Oxford University Press, 2005).
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distinct persons or legal entities, but also economically and functionally independent from
the seller, outside the seller’s organizational structure, sphere of control or responsibility.22
In cases where the defects result from a failure of this genuinely “independent” third person,
the  prerequisites  for  exemption under  Article  79(2)  have  to  be  met  cumulatively  by  both  the
seller and the third person. In this particular case, the seller’s liability stretches to answer for the
conduct of such an independent “third person”, unless the impediment was insuperable for the
seller  and,  additionally,  the  independent  third  person  would  qualify  for  exemption  under
Article 79(1) if such third person had been the seller. Thus, Article 79(2) is meant to increase
the seller’s liability, for it makes the seller in principle responsible for defective performance
incurred by independent third persons as if it were the seller’s own conduct.23 Of  course  the
seller’s liability is not unconditional, for in exceptional cases he may be able to establish that he
had no control over the choice of such third person, either because the third person enjoys a
monopoly in the supply of goods or services, or if the third person was chosen by the buyer, or
if the seller may otherwise establish that default by the third person was actually beyond his
control.
To the extent that the circumstances of the case allow a distinction between the two types of
“third  persons,”  it  is  clear  that  it  would  be  more  difficult  for  the  seller  to  be  exempted  from
liability for the acts of an “independent” third person under Article 79(2), than to be
exonerated for the delivery of non-conforming goods procured from or manufactured by a
supplier to whom the seller has resorted to deliver the goods. However, the drafting history of
Article 79(2) reflects confusion by some delegates, to whom the policy of making it more
difficult  for  the  seller  to  be  exempted  of  liability  on  account  of  the  conduct  of  a  genuinely
independent “third person” was not so clear. Those delegates sought unsuccessfully to expressly
include suppliers, subcontractors, and any person working independently for the seller under
Article 79(2).24
22 See Denis Tallon, in Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (ed. by M.
Bianca and M.J. Bonell, Milan, 1987) at 545, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html>.
23 According to UNCITRAL’s official records, tightening the conditions under which a seller could claim
exemption sought to avoid, among other consequences, ”that a party should be exempted from liability because he
had chosen an unreliable supplier ...”. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods prepared by UNCITRAL’s Secretariat, Official Records, United Nations, New York, 1981 [hereinafter
”Commentary on the 1978 Draft Convention”] § 23 at 379 par. 23 (motion by Denmark) and § 35 at 380 (comment
by Norwegian delegate).
24 See A. Vischer, Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and of the Buyer, in The 1980 Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods 179 (Lausanne Colloquium, November 19-20, 1984). If the
explicit inclusion of suppliers would have been carried into paragraph (2) of Article 79, it would have eliminated
the possibility of exemption for the seller in cases of non-conformity, because the suppliers and sub-suppliers who
manufactured the goods could never qualify for the exemption. But the rejection of the proposal to include the
suppliers explicitly into paragraph (2) of Article 79 does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the seller’s
potential exemption of liability for non-conforming goods is to be placed under paragraph (1) of Article 79.
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If anything, Article 79(2) and its legislative history suggests that the phrase “a third person
whom [a party] has engaged to perform the contract” should be given a narrow scope, covering
cases such as those in which the seller turns over to a third person the seller’s obligation to
manufacture the goods according to specifications given by the buyer, or whenever the seller
delegates to a third person the seller’s  obligation to procure the goods and deliver them to the
buyer. In either case, the seller can succeed on a claim to be exempted for damages for failure to
perform only if the seller can establish that the third person was himself prevented to perform by
an impediment qualifying as an excuse under Article 79(2).25 This interpretative approach appears
to be consistent with a sound allocation of risks arising from nonconformity of the goods.
Although a seller who depends on ancillary suppliers cannot always control the conformity of the
goods, it seems fair to assign to the seller the risk of non-conformity and resulting damages for
non-conformity as part of the overall procurement risk borne by sellers. Even though the first and
second paragraphs of Article 79 provide for different requirements for a party to be excused on
account of another person’s failure to perform, for all practical purposes most cases are likely to
be resolved under Article 79(1). This is, indeed, the conclusion reached by the German Supreme
Court (BGH) in the “Vine wax case” referred to in connection with the question whether a seller
could ever be exempt under Article 79 for delivering non-conforming goods.
In that case, an Austrian seller invoked an exemption from liability under Article 79(1) on the
ground  that  it  played  the  role  of  a  mere  intermediary  in  a  contract  to  supply  vine  wax  to  a
German buyer, which vine wax the seller had manufactured with raw materials acquired from a
Hungarian supplier. The seller’s central argument was that it was exempted from liability under
Article 79 on the grounds that the alleged defects were caused by the supplier and were,
therefore, “beyond his control.” The BGH held that it makes no difference under Article 79(1)
whether the defect could be imputed to the seller or to its suppliers or sub-suppliers. According
to the court, the existence of the defects should in any event be imputed to the seller, for even if
caused by the suppliers or sub-suppliers, such defects are deemed to be within the seller’s
“sphere of influence.” In a subsequent case, also touching upon Article 79, the “Powder milk
case”,26 the BGH once again suggested that it is “all the seller’s fault” even in cases where the
failure to perform appears to be blamed on the seller’s suppliers. Since the seller was unable to
establish whether the lipase that spoiled the powdered milk had been introduced by his whole
milk suppliers or during the seller’s processing of the milk, the BGH reversed a lower court
judgment  with  instructions  to  ascertain  whether  the  spoiling  of  the  powdered  milk  had  been
actually beyond the seller’s control.
25 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for Inernational Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention 546-46
(Kluwer International, 2d ed., 1999).
26 BGH  9  January  2002,  available  in  English  translation  at  <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/020109g1.html>.
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Attributing to the seller the responsibility for the supplier’s actions under Article 79(1)
appears consistent with a sound policy of placing the risks involved in non-conformity on the
party who is in the best position to avoid or minimize those risks. The seller may be exempted
from liability in some extreme and exceptional cases, such as when the supplier is the only
available source of supply, or when other supplies are unavailable due to unforeseeable and
extraordinary events, or in situations in which the defects in the goods are unconnected with
the typical procurement risks assumed by the seller.
3.1 A change of circumstances that could not reasonably be expected to have been taken into account, rendering
performance excessively onerous (“hardship”), may qualify as an “impediment” under Article 79(1). The
language of Article 79 does not expressly equate the term “impediment” with an event that makes
performance absolutely impossible. Therefore, a party that finds itself in a situation of hardship may invoke
hardship as an exemption from liability under Article 79.
3.2 In a situation of hardship under Article 79, the court or arbitral tribunal may provide further relief
consistent with the CISG and the general principles on which it is based.
Comments
Under a variety of legal doctrines, most of which can be traced back to the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus developed by the Roman preaetor, unforeseeable and extraordinary change of
circumstances rendering a contractual obligation extremely burdensome though not absolutely
impossible, may entail the avoidance or even the revision or “adaptation” of the contract or one
of its clauses. The variety of national laws and legal doctrines (e.g., imprévision, frustration of
contract, commercial impracticability, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, eccesiva onerosita sopravvenuta),
coupled with the amplitude of the term “impediment” in Article 79, provides a fertile ground
for judges and arbitrators to take divergent approaches to the question whether a party whose
performance has turned extraordinarily burdensome (in economic terms or otherwise,
hereinafter identified as “hardship”).27 Not  surprisingly,  scholarly  opinions  are  divided  on
whether this situation of hardship, short of impossibility, is governed by Article 79. Whereas
some consider that the wording of Article 79 is sufficiently flexible to include an extreme
27 See Tallon, Article 79, in Commentary on the International Sales Law. The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention § 3.1
at 592 (1987), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html>  ;  Hans  Stoll  &  Georg
Gruber, in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary on the U.N. Convention, op. cit. supra, Article 79, § 39, at 822-
26. See also Honnold, Uniform Law, op. cit. supra, at 434 (suggesting the adoption of a ”comparative law
approach” towards the notion of impediment under Article 79, taking into account the ”prevailing patterns and
trends of modern domestic law”).
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situation of unexpected hardship within the meaning of “impediment”,28 others opine that
there is no place in the CISG for any relief on account of economic hardship.29
Concerns for the word “impediment” employed in Article 79 and its proper interpretation have
been  voiced  by  commentators  from  a  broad  spectrum  of  legal  systems.  According  to  one
scholarly opinion the word “impediment” is “vague and imprecise,”30 another pointed to several
“contradictions and ambiguities” in the use of that term,31 and a third characterized the word
“impediment” as a “chameleon-like” example of “superficial harmony which merely mutes a
deeper discord.” 32 The legislative as well as the drafting history of Article 79 is not conclusive
enough  to  warrant  a  conclusion  that  the  hardship  problem  was  meant  to  be  excluded  or
included within its scope.
As  to  the  legislative  history  of  Article  79,  there  is  ample  support  for  the  proposition  that  the
Convention does not favor an easy exemption from nonperformance and that the notion of
“impediment” under Article 79 points to an insurmountable obstacle that is unrelated to the
more flexible notions of hardship, impracticability, frustration, or the like.33 However, that
background is insufficient to warrant the conclusion that CISG Article 79 cannot exempt a
28 See, e.g., Denis Tallon in Commentary on the International Sales Law Article 79 at § 3.2 (1987) (”[T]he judge
will have a natural tendency to refer to similar concepts in his own law. Thus, the judge of a socialist country will
have a restrictive approach to force majeure... On the contrary a common lawyer will feel inclined to refer to the
more flexible notions of frustration and impracticability. In the Roman-German system, the judge will reason in
terms of force majeure...”). See also M. J. Bonell, Force majeure e hardship nel diritto uniforme della vendita
internazionale, in Diritto del commercio internazionale 590 (1990) (observing that by requiring that the obligor ”could
not reasonably be expected ... to have avoided or overcome [the impediment] or its consequences” suggests that, at
least in principle, the possibility should be entertained that performance has become so onerous that it would be
unreasonable to enforce it).
29 See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, who observed that exemption of liability on account of unexpected and excessive
economic hardship was ”out of place” in a sales law. Progress Report of the Working Group on the International
Sale of Goods on the Work of its Fifth Session (A/CN.9/87, Annex III, reprinted in UNCITRAL YEARBOOK
V:1974 (1975) at 66.
30 B. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods §
5.02 at 5-4 (Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, ed. Nina M. Galston & Hans
Smit, 1984), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html>.
31 D. Tallon,  Commentary  to  Article  79,  in  Commentary  on the  International  Sales  Law.  The  1980 Vienna
Sales Convention 594 (Giuffre, Milan, 1987), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html>.
32 E. A. Farnsworth, Perspective of Common Law Countries,  in  La  vendita  internazionale  19  (Congress  at  S.
Margherita Ligure, Sept. 1980, Giuffre, 1981).
33 Article  79  was  drafted  in  response  to  the  criticism  of  Article  74  of  the  1964  Uniform  Law  on
International Sales, to the effect that ”a party could be too readily excused from performing his contract.” But the
criticism  that  ULIS  Article  74  was  insufficiently  clear  and  subjective  lead  to  the  substitution  of  the  word
”impediment” for ”circumstances,” so that the conditions for exemption are more narrowly and objectively
identified. It is  on record that one of the reasons for the UNCITRAL’s Working Group’s adoption of the term
”impediment” in Article 79 was to exclude the scenario, envisioned under Article 74 of ULIS, in which the obligor
could escape liability when performance had become unexpectedly difficult for reasons beyond his control.
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party from performing its obligations, in whole or in part, when the impediment is
represented by a totally unexpected event that makes performance excessively difficult.
As to the drafting history of this provision, isolated discussion of proposals that were dismissed
or the comments by some delegates may lead one to conclude that there was some type of
consensus among the members of the Working Group against the doctrine of “hardship.”34 In
fact, some passages of the travaux préparatoires appear  to  indicate  that  the  choice  of  the  word
“impediment” was made for the purpose of adopting a unitary conception of exemption with
the intention of setting aside the theory of rebus sic stantibus, imprévision, or hardship theories
based on “changed circumstances.” Thus, according to some legal commentators, the exclusion
(rectius: rejection) of hardship from the scope of Article 79 would emerge from its drafting
history.35 Following the successive drafts preceding what finally became Article 79, the Working
Group of UNCITRAL considered but rejected a proposal allowing a party to claim avoidance
or adjustment of a contract whenever facing unexpected “excessive damages”.36 Yet, a closer
look  at  this  passage  reveals  that  after  briefly  setting  out  the  arguments  in  support  of  the
proposal, the report simply stated that it was not adopted, not reappearing in subsequent
discussions.37
Other  commentators  have  seized  upon  the  rejection  of  a  Norwegian  proposal  linked  to  a
passage of what later became Article 79(3) in order to infer a rejection of the position that
Article 79 may extend its application to a situation of genuine hardship. Thus, when the issue
of temporary impediment came up for discussion at the Diplomatic Conference, the Norwegian
delegation suggested the inclusion of an additional provision to the effect that the temporary
exemption  from  performing  may  turn  into  a  permanent  exemption  if,  after  the  impediment
ceases to exist, the circumstances had so changed that performance would become manifestly
unreasonable.38 The proposal gained significant support from other delegations, but the French
delegate raised his concerns that introducing such a provision may be regarded as an acceptance
of doctrines such as imprévision, frustration of purpose, and the like. Although the recollection
of  the  discussions  among  the  participant  delegates,  or  what  should  be  made  out  of  those
34 See the discussion in John Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales 185, 252
(1989) (hereinafter Honnold, Documentary History).
35 See Honnold, Documentary History, at 252.
36 See Honnold, Documentary History, op. cit. supra, at 350, recalling that a proposal aimed at incorporating
an article allowing a party to ”claim an adequate amendment of the contract or its termination” on account of
”excessive difficulties” was expressly rejected by UNCITRAL’s Working Group.
37 Report  of  Committee  of  the  Whole  I  Relating  to  the  Draft  Convention  on  the  International  Sale  of
Goods (A/32/17, annex I, paras. 458-60), reprinted in UNCITRAL YEARBOOK VIII:1977 (1978), 57. See also
John Honnold, Documentary History at 350.
38 See  A/Conf.97/C.1/SR.27  at  10.  The  Norwegian  proposal  lead  to  the  deletion  of  the  word  ”only”  in
Article 79(3), so that even if the initial and temporary impediment vanishes, the resulting change of circumstances,
which may well be of an economic nature, may turn into another impediment leading to that party’s exemption
from liability.
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discussions, is far from uniform, the rejection of the Norwegian proposal did not settle the
issue of economic hardship because it was actually not discussed as such. If it is accepted that
the drafting history has any controlling role to play -  which is  a debatable issue -  such history
evidences that the discussions were not conclusive on this question.39
Several court decisions have rejected the possibility that negative market developments constitute
an impediment within Article 79(1). Indeed, as of the time of the drafting of this opinion, no
court has exempted a party from liability on the grounds of economic hardship. As to noticeable
case-law developments, a German court of first instance is reported to have stated in dicta that the
German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage does not apply because the CISG “fills the field
in this area” and therefore forces out the otherwise applicable domestic law.40 An Italian court of
first  instance,  in  a  decision  reported  in  the  same  year,  in  a  case  that  was  not  governed  by  the
CISG, considered but ultimately refused to apply the doctrine of “supervening excessive
onerousness,” as adopted in Article 1467 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code.41
According to the Italian court in Monza, this variation on the doctrine of “hardship” could not
conceivably find its way into the Vienna Sales Convention, because hardship is not expressly
excluded under Article 4 of the CISG, thus being an issue left unsettled in the CISG.42
39 Speculation about what the intention of the drafting group might have been with regard to the scope of
application of CISG Article 79 is unlikely to be too accurate, especially when we are left to our inferences from
fragments  in  the  travaux  préparatoires.  Indeed,  the  dismissal  of  a  proposal  which did  not  even address  whether
hardship should be given any space within the Convention is no proper foundation upon which to build an
argument on the ”intention of the legislator”.
40 LG Aachen, Germany, UNILEX, No. 43 0 136/92 (May 14, 1993) (the case involved a German seller of
acoustic prosthetics against an Italian buyer who refused to take delivery of the goods under the contract).
41 Nuova Fucinati, S.p.A., v. Fondmetall International A.B., Tribunale di Monza, Italy, 14 January 1993, Clout
No.  54,  reproduced  in  English  translation  15  J.L.  &  Com.  153  (1995),  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html>. In this case, the Italian seller’s (Nuova Fucinati) failed to
deliver 1,000 tons of metal that a Swedish buyer, Fondmetall, had contracted to purchase. Faced with a court-
imposed injunction sought by Fondmetall, Nuova Fucinati alleged that delivery of the 1,000 tons of metal was
impossible  due  to  Fondmetall’s  refusal  to  take  delivery  of  another  load of  metal  ordered  at  the  same time.  The
Italian seller also sought to avoid its obligation to the Swedish buyer arguing that,  prior to delivery of the 1,000
tons of metal,  the price of the goods on the international market had risen so swiftly and unexpectedly that the
fundamental equilibrium of the performances had been significantly altered, to the point of justifying the
termination of the contract under Article 1467 of the Italian Civil Code.
42 The Italian court’s discussion as to the applicability of Article 79 to an ”impediment” that makes
performance short of impossible was pure dicta, because the court decided that CISG was not applicable.
According to the court of Monza, the CISG could not apply under Article 1(1)(a) because the CISG had not
entered into force in Sweden at the time the contract was concluded and it was not applicable under Article 1(1)(b)
because, in the opinion of the court, such a provision applies only in the absence of an express choice of law by the
parties.  For a critical view on this approach to applicability of the CISG, see Ferrari, Uniform Law of International
Sales: Issues of Applicability Under Private International Law, 15 J. L. & Com. 159, 161 (1995), available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferr1.html>.
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There are not many cases dealing with situations of hardship in which courts have found it
fair to provide relief, and no cases have been found at the time this opinion is drafted in which
a court has provided well-grounded reasons explaining why a change in circumstances was
unpredictable or why one type of relief was more appropriate than others. To this date, there
are  no  reported  decisions  whereby  a  court  exempted  a  party  from  liability  on  the  ground  of
hardship. This state of affairs is not inconsistent with the admission, by a majority of legal
commentators, that a fair legal system should admit some flexibility within the general principle
of pacta sunt servanda to account for a genuine situation of hardship. The question to be raised
then is what type of factual scenario may be proposed for an exceptionally “hard” case of
hardship that would merit relief.
Resorting to the type of scenarios designed in the comments accompanying UNIDROIT
Principles Article 6.2.2, one may envision a situation where a buyer “A”, domiciled in State X,
concludes  a  contract  of  sale  with  a  seller  “B”,  domiciled  in  State  Y.  Payment  is  agreed  to  be
made in State Z within three months, upon delivery of the goods, in the currency of State Z. Let
us imagine that within a month of the conclusion of the contract a totally unpredictable
political and economic crisis, which the parties could not have reasonably taken into account,
leads to a massive devaluation of 80% of Z’s currency. As a result of this totally unanticipated
and massive devaluation of the currency, the sale turns out extremely burdensome for the buyer
“A” and a gross windfall for the seller “B”.43
Assuming then that the CISG applies to a contract subject to a situation of hardship such as
the one previously described, the question is whether the aggrieved party should be entitled to
find  relief  under  the  terms  of  the  CISG  by  reading  the  word  “impediment”  in  Article  79  to
include  hardship  or  by  concluding  that  there  is  a  gap  within  the  CISG  to  be  filled  by  some
underlying general principle via the “governed-but-not-settled” gap-filling technique promoted
by CISG Art. 7(2). If the CISG applies, then it naturally preempts other, potentially applicable
domestic rules dealing with hardship. But if the hardship question cannot be thus settled, there
is no alternative other than resorting to domestic legal rules, hoping that the applicable law
would provide for some risk-share allocation of remedies.
The alternative of resolving the hardship problem within the four corners of the CISG is more
palatable than the other, because leaving the question to the conflict of law rules of the forum
leads to a great diversity of potentially applicable legal doctrines. It is submitted that the
interpreter  who  takes  seriously  the  CISG’s  confessed  purpose  of  unifying  the  law  of  sales,  as
43 Admittedly, it is not easy to ascertain whether the change in circumstances could not have been reasonably
foreseen. It is not an easier task to distinguish between the risk of loss that every contracting party should be deemed
to have assumed and the extraordinary disastrous economic disadvantages amounting to a ”limit of sacrifice” (because
there is indeed such a limit), beyond which the obligor should not be expected to perform the contract as written. For
an enlightening discussion of a ”true hardship problem” based on a factual scenario in which a deal unexpectedly
turned into a ”nightmare” for one party and a ”steal” for the other, see Joseph Lookofsky, Walking the Article 7(2)
Tightrope Between CISG and Domestic Law, 21 Journal of Law and Commerce 87 (2005).
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articulated in Article 7(1), will probably exhaust all technically available means to respond to
the hardship problem within the “four corners” of the Convention, rather than resorting to the
application of potentially disparate domestic legal rules and doctrines.
Before proceeding to examine the type of relief that may be found under the CISG for a true
hardship problem, it is important to recall that termination or adjustment of a contract on
grounds of hardship may be regarded in some legal systems as a validity-related issue, so that it
may be argued that the hardship issue is excluded from the scope of application of the CISG by
virtue of Article 4.44 The argument deserves careful consideration, because it has been reported
that in some Scandinavian legal systems the issue of hardship is approached as an issue of
validity.45 In this case, there is something to be said in favor of granting the defaulting party the
benefit of finding appropriate relief by choosing among competing domestic doctrines of
hardship. But this approach does not sound convincing or persuasive. Unlike a situation of
unconscionability (usury, lésion or gross disparity of the performances at the time the contract is
concluded), which clearly falls under the rubric of validity, the hardship problem tends to be
associated in most legal systems with force majeure or impossibility of performance, that is, a
situation of exoneration or mitigation of liability due to events subsequent to the conclusion of
the contract, more than as a case of nullity or avoidance due to infirmities or flaws affecting the
contract from its inception.46 Moreover, every benefit potentially obtained from allowing
national doctrines of hardship to compete for its application is more than offset by the high
price in terms of uniformity that is to be paid under this approach.
44 See J. Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG in the USA (2d ed., 2004) § 2.6 and Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits
of Commercial Contract Freedom Under the UNIDROIT ‘Restatement’ and Danish Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. Law 485, 496
(1998), also available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky6.html>, referring to the hardship
provisions  in  the  General  Clause  of  the  Danish  Contracts  Act,  authorizing  a  court  to  refuse  enforcement  or  to
adjust ”any unreasonable contract or term, and that includes a term which becomes unreasonable after the
contract is made”. Professor Lookofsky also refers to Dutch Civil Code Article 6.258(1) as an illustration of a
provision that appears to question the ”validity” of a contract (”Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court
may  modify  the  effects  of  a  contract  or  it  may  set  it  aside;  in  whole  or  in  part,  on  the  basis  of  unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not
expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given
retroactive effect.”).
45 See, e.g., Tom Southerington, Impossibility of Performance and Other Excuses in International Trade,
Publication  of  the  Faculty  of  Law  of  the  University  of  Turku,  Private  law  publication  series  B:55,  available  at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/southerington.html>. Southerington refers to Section 36(1) of the
Finnish Contracts Act, which the author considers as a rule of validity akin to unconscionability.
46 A much criticized 1993 decision by the Tribunale Civile di Monza entered (unnecessarily for the purposes
of the case before the court) to examine the legal nature of hardship under Italian law and its relationship with the
CISG. The Italian court stated that ”... hardship is not a matter expressly excluded in Article 4 of the CISG.
Dissolution of the contract for supervening excessive onerousness affects neither the validity of the contract nor
ownership  over  the  goods  ...”).  Tribunale  Civile  di  Monza,  14  January  1993,  CLOUT  Case  54,  reproduced  in
English in <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html>.
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law
issue 2008#1
21
If it is accepted that a situation of genuinely unexpected and radically changed circumstances,
in truly exceptional cases, may qualify as an “impediment” under Article 79(1), it deserves a
legal response under the Convention that would preempt the application of domestic rules on
hardship.
It is certainly not possible or even convenient to attempt a definition of hardship, beyond
accepting that the impediment may entail a situation of “economic impossibility” which, while
short of an absolute bar to perform, imposes what in some legal systems is conceptualized as a
“limit of sacrifice” beyond which the obligor cannot be reasonably expected to perform.
In most cases market fluctuations are not to be considered an “impediment” under CISG
Article 79, because such fluctuations are a normal risk of commercial transactions in general.
Whether wild and totally unexpected market fluctuations in goods or currency could ever
become an “impediment” is another matter. Indeed, the theoretical possibility of such radical
and unexpected changes admits the application of Article 79 in those rare instances as the one
exemplified above.
The next issue to tackle is to ascertain the contours of the remedial guidelines that may be
followed to grant the most appropriate remedy or relief after hardship has been found to exist.
One may infer from the obligation to interpret the Convention in good faith a duty imposed
upon the parties to renegotiate the terms of the contract with a view to restore a balance of the
performances. In case negotiations fail, there are no guidelines under the Convention for a
court or arbitrator to “adjust,” or “revise” the terms of the contract so as to restore the balance
of the performances. Even if one were not ready to stretch the principle of good faith buried in
CISG Article 7(1) in order to find a balance of the performances,47 CISG Article 79(5) may be
relied upon to open up the possibility for a court or arbitral tribunal to determine what is owed
to each other, thus “adapting” the terms of the contract to the changed circumstances.
47 A  suggestion  by  Peter  Schlechtriem  to  this  effect  may  be  found  in Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales
Convention, in 18 Journal of Law and Commerce 191-258, 236-37 (1999), available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/workshop-79.html>.
